The Tunku arranged a five-day visit to Sarawak in the beginning of July 1966 to smoothe over, and line up additional support for, a coup in the state cabinet that had been pulled off a few weeks earlier with assistance from Kuala Lumpur. Travelling on the flagship of the Royal Malaysian navy, K.D. Hang Tuah, he was accompanied by several of his colleagues in the federal cabinet: Khaw Kai Boh (local Government), Senu Abdul Rahman (Information and Broadcasting), Tan Sri V.T. Sambanthan (Posts, Telecommunications and works), and Sarawak's Abdul Rahman Yakub (Lands and Mines). The Tunku's intention was to overwhelm the populace with the power and prestige of the federal government and to convince everyone in Sarawak of the justifications and merits of the changes that had taken place. Syed Kechik joined the party when the ship anchored at sibu on July 1. he had been following recent news from Sarawak and was aware of the more superficial aspects of problems there. But he was also aware of the fragility of relationships between the Borneo states and Kuala Lumpur and chagrined by the detached confidence with which federal leaders seemed to approach their mission in Sarawak. A number of them assumed that their mere presence would be sufficient to stabilize the situation in Kuala Lumpur's favour. In response to Syed Kechik's questions, they responded only that they were there to patch up some small differences. Rather naive to the realities of East Malaysian politics, he thought, where minor differences were sufficient cause for seccession. When the entourage left by launch for Kapit for a regatta and mass rally organized to demonstrate support for the new state government, the federal government, and Malaysia itself, Syed Kechik searched out a number of state leaders, including Thomas Kana, the Pesaka Secretary-General and a member of Parliament. On the four-hour trip up the Rejang, he plied them with questions to find out what really had been going on. In early june, some members of the Council Negeri, Sarawak's legislative assembly, had moved to displace Datuk Stephen Kalong Ningkan as Chief Minister. ningkan's Sarawak National party (SNAP) was a component of the Sarawak Alliance, in partnership with Barisan Rakyat Jati Sarawak (Barjasa), Party Pesaka Anak Sarawak (Pesaka), Party Negara Sarawak (PANAS) and the Sarawak Chinese Association (SCA), but Pesaka and Barjasa were increaisngly disagreeing with Ningkan's stance on a number of key issues and were clearly dissatisfied with his style. Having served as Chief Minister since his days before independence, Ningkan had already been the focus of one cabinet crisis in May 1965, precipitated by his introduction of some unpopular land bills. With confrontation then at its peak, it was necessary to seek a compromise, and there resulted only a shuffling of cabinet portfolios with Ningkan's retaining the Chief Ministership. The power struggle between SNAP on one hand and Pesaka anbd Barjasa on the other remained unsolved, however, and this was a constant source of friction in the Sarawak Alliance. Ningkan had also become unacceptable toi the federal government in a manner which had many parallels with the situation in Sabah some months before. he and his colleagues were closely allied with expatriate officers, and Kuala lumpur found that in many of its dealings with Sarawak, it was negotiating with expartriates, not Malaysians. ningkan was also sympathetic towards Singapore, and after Singapore eparation, the issue of states' rights again came to the fore. Ningkan disliked the intervention of Kala Lumpur in Sarawak's affairs and was suspicious of any state politician who seemed to be spending undue time in the federal capital. His personal outrages were also becoming excessive, much to the embarassment of all those who were touched. At public gatherings, he had accosted members of Parliament and the Council Negeri with threats of bodily harm, detention, and deportattion, with assertions of th epower of his wealth and manliness and with promises to take Sarwak out of Malaysia if Kuala Lumpur did not abide with his views. Like stephens, he had been given a free hand by the Tunku to govern as he saw fit, but when this treatened the unity of the nation, he had to be reined in. and with the Indonesian Confrontation drawing to a close, the need for apparently cordial relations between state and federal governments was superceded by the need to subordinate idiosyncratic state interests to federal imperatives. In early June, Sarawak leaders unhappy with Ningkan's rule had garnered the signatures of 21 of the 32 Sarawak Alliance members in the Council Negeri to a statement that Ningkan no longer held their confidence and that they wanted him to step down as Chief Minister. getting wind of this, Ningkan dismissed Taib Mahmud, one of the instigators, from his post as Minister of Communications and Works in the state cabinet on June 12. the following day, three other dissent state ministers resigned, knowing their fate to be sealed, and all 21 signatories flew off to Kuala lumpur. After consulting with National Alliance leaders, the disaffected Council Negeri members cabled Kuching, asking ningkan for his resignation and informing him they would not attend the meeting of the Council Negeri scheduled for June 14. Although it may have seemed obvious for them to have sat at this meeting and called for a vote of no confidence, the coup leaders wanted the showdown outside the Council Negeri. There were two reasons for this. First, there was some uncertainty as to whether their 21 votes were sufficent to bring Ningkan down. The Council Negeri had 42 members- including 36 elected,three appointed,a dn three ex officio members - plus the Speaker. The elected and appointed seats were then allocated as follows: of the Sarawak Alliance seats, Pesaka held 15, barjasa five, SCA three, SNAP six, and PANAS three; of the opposition seats, SUPP held five, Machia one, and there was one independent. Supporting the anti-Ningkan move were the 20 Pesaka and Barjasa members and one PANAS member. This left 21 members on the other side and, in the event of a stalemate, the Speaker would have had to cast his vote for the status quo. Second, even if the three ex officio members were debarred from voting on a political matter, the coup organizers were uncertain whether they could hold on to all 21 members in a direct confrontation with Ningkan on the Council floor. In the previous year's crisis, Ningkan had pressured a number of fence-sitters to his side in the eleventh hour, and with patronage in his hands, it was feared he might be able to do it again in this encounter. The arean chosen for the power struggle was, therefore, to be within the Alliance, noyt the COuncil Negeri which Ningkan would clearly have preffered. When Ningkan rebuffed the cable request, it was decided taht an appeal would be made to the Governor, Tun Abang Haji Openg, asserting that Ningkan no longer had the confidence of the national Alliance, the Sarawak Alliance and the council Negeri itself. If Ningkan refused to resign, he would be dismissed by the Governor. On June 15, the 21 Sarawak Alliance members flew into Kuching, together with a number of federal personalities: Home Minister Tun (Dr.) Ismail, Attorney-General Abdul Kadir Yusof, Local Government Minister Khaw Kai Boh, and the Inspector-General of Police, Tan Sri Salleh Ismael. It was a calculated display of federal power. Tun Ismail summoned Ningkan and demanded his resignation based on the prerogatives of the Chairman of the national Alliance, Tunku Abdul Rahman. Ningkan surprisingly demurred, daying that he could not accept the arvitrary decision of the executive committee of the national Alliance Party and that the matter could only be devided by a vote in the Council Negeri. Ningkan subsequently instructed the Governor to dissolve the Council, but the request was rejected on the grounds that elections could not possibly be held within the 60 days stipulated by the constitution. Tun Ismail then urged the Governor to call for Ningkan's dismissal. The Governor had been informed two days earlier by Tan Sri Jugah, the Pesaka leader and federal Minister for their confidence in Ningkan, although two of them had not yet signed the statement. When the Govenor learned on June 16 that these members were coming to inform him of this persona;;y, he consulted with the state Attorney-General about the latitude of his powers and concluded taht because he had the power to dismiss him. Moreover, the question of whether 21 constituted a majority was to him clear. He had been a standing member of the Council Negeri since 1940 and knew that it was the practice of ex officio members not to take sides agreed with this. The Govenor then requested taht the 21 members meet with him at the State Chamber of the Astana (the Govenor's residence) and present their petition. He asked each member, in the presence of the Attorney-General, if they signed the statement voluntarily, and all asserted they had. The Governor decided that he was fully justified in dismissing Ningkan, particularly because of the national Alliance's strong posture on the matter, and he announced the dismissal the next day. On the recommendation of the Saraweak Alliance and with the blessing of the Tunku, he appointedf Penghulu Tawi Sli as the new Chief Minister at the same time. Ningkan was down but by no means out. He fikled a suit contesting the legality and legitimacy of his dismisal. The Sarawak constitution did not prescribe that a vote in the Council Negeri is a prerequsite to dismissal, but precedent seemed to ndicate taht it was. The Prime Minister, as Chairman of the national Alliance, did not hold ratifying power over the appointment of the national Alliance, did hold ratifying power over the appointment of Alliance chief ministers, but Ningkan still held two-thirds of the Sarawak Alliance Council: component parties each had six votes in the Sarawak Alliance Council, and with PANAS and the SCA behind Ningkan, the ousted Chief Minister could calim 18 of the 30 votes. Moreover, the majority in the council Negeri was of elected members, not of the full membership. The new state government, along with national Alliance leaders, realized it was necessary to make the ground it stood on more firm. hence, the Tunku's visit to Sarawak. AS the Tunku's party returned to Sibu from Kapit, Syed Kechik worked with a few others drafting a speech the Tunku wa sto deliver to a large gathering in Sibu that night. The address explained the actions that had been deemed necessary to maintain order in the state and artivulated concern for loyalty and unity among all Malaysian states. The changes in the Sarawak state cabinet were postured as having been initiated in Kuching and facilitated by essentially innocent federal leasers only at Lubhing's request. Sentiment against Kuala Lumpur's intervention in state affairs was running high, and any growth of this sentiment had to be clipped with assertions of the federal govt's awareness of the desire in Sarawak for autonomy in certain areas. But the Tunku's approach was more statemanlike than logical, and he relied more on the power of federal persuasion than on a frontal to the matters at issue - doubtless ubder-estimating the willingess of Sarawak politician to stand up against the wished of Kuala Lumpur. Ningkan was not sitting by idly in Kuching. On July 1, he had filed another suit, this time seeking an injubction against Tawi Sli and his cabinet to restrain them from acting as ministers. On July 3, concurrent with the arrival of the Tunku's party in Kuching, SNAP held their annual general meeting and passed a resolution to withdraw from the natonal Alliance because of the national party's having consulted with only two of the five component parties of the Sarawak Alliance before tasking what was felt to be an unconstitutional action. The new state govt, together with the federal personalities, therefore initiated negotiations with PANAS and the SCA in order to make Ningkan's claims of holding a majority in the Sarawak Alliance superfluous. And with olitical manoeuvrings ubder way in private nmeetings, maximum capital was being gained from the Tunku's prestigious presence. A large reception was staged in Kuching to submerge the efforts of Ningkan to challenge the recent changes with public statements. Wile the Tunku and the rest of his party were occupied with official functions for the next two days. Syed Kechik met with Pesala and Barjasa leaders to inform himself more fully of the dimensions and ramificationsof the existing political situation, delving into the party structures, the areas of their support, the leanings of all personalities involved, and the analysis of party performances and activities to construct a mirror for anticipating future motives and actions. When the Tunku and his entourage returned to Kuala Lumpur on July 5, Syed Kechik was asked to stay out for a while in Sarawak to oversee the enlisting of PANAS and SCA support, to help develop the state govt's strategies, and to build up the image of Tawi Sli and Pesaka, much in the manner he had been building up Tun Mustapha and USNO in Sabah. The SCA was the first to join up with Pesaka and Barjasa. After some convincing by MCA leaders from Kuala Lumpur, whichincluded promises of SCA representation in the state cabinet, the SCA announced their alignment with the new govt on July 6. PANAS was also coming in line and within a week they, too, would announce their support for the Tawi Sli govt. Having lost their majority in the Sarawak Alliance Council, Ningkan and his SNAP colleagues went into opposition. Syed Kechik saw the need for grooming some strong figures in the state cabinet to counter the attacks of Bibgkan that would be forthcoming, with the advic of expartriates, in future sessions of the Council Negeri. Tawi Sli was too soft-spoken and unassuming to take on such task. Taib Mahmud was sufficiently articulate but, in Syed Kechik's mind a little too detached from political realities at this early stage in his career. Tanm Sri Jugah was a natural leader with great flair and warmth, but unfortunately could not read or write. Tho,as Kana, of all the personalites involved, was the most capable and promenent. Although Kana was the obvious person to have taken over from Ningkan as Chief Minister, his seat was in Parliament, not in the Counvil Negeri. By early July, Kana was acting as a political scretary to Tawi Sli and was, in effect, a shadow Chief Minister working with Taib and Rahman Yakub to decide on cabinet appointment and policy moves. Syed Kechik initiated a quiet campaign on Kana's behalf, attempting to condition the parties and the public to accept his eventual leadership and drafted a series of statement for him. One of these was a speech delievered to members of the Sarawak press on July 16 proposing the formation of a Sarawak Foundation along the same lines as the Sabah Foundation. The speech was virtually identical to the one delivered by Tun Mustapha the previous November, except for minor alterations to make the wording appropriate to the Sarawak context. Theproposal fell flat, however, given the turn of events, and would remain moot until reopen 5 years later. No base could be found for Kana in the Council Negeri because none of the three appointed memers would resign his seat. Ling Beng Siong and Teo Kui Seng of the SCA both had state cabinet aspirations about to be realized, and Taib Mahmud was already heading the new state Ministry of Development and Forestry. The task of building up Tawi Sli was more difficult than building up a natural politician like Tun Mustapha. The new Chief Minister was timid, ot highly educated, and rather simplistic in his approach to politics. Nevertheless Syed Kechik drafted daily statements o Tawi Sli's behalf for release to the press and together with the state Director of Information composed speeches to be read by tawi Sli on the evening radio broadcasts-all dealing with the explanation of actions taken to dismiss Ningkan, the policy of the federal govt to make Malay the national language, the land issue and larger matters of development. The public and the opposition were surprised by the strength and resolve inherent in Tawi Sli's tough statements and speecghes, as was Tawi Sli himself. By mid-July, the Sarawak Alliance seemed reasonably well poised to be able to consolidate its position of power. There were flaws, to be sure: Tawi Sli was not the dynamo taht some peopel were begining to think he was ; strggles for power between the member parties of the Sarawak Alliance' as then constituted, were far from resolved and Ningkan appeared certain to remain a strong minority voice. but enough initial direction had been given and with things satisfactorily in motion, Syed Kechik returned to Sabah. He was anxious to get back to his wife, who was about to give birth to their first child and to pick up on the campaign for Tun Mustapha and USNO. But less than a month later, he was asked by Kuala Lumpyur to return to Sraawak. The Speaker was reluctant to cooperate with the overnor's request that a meeting of the Council Negeri be called; the court cases filed by Ningkan were about to be heard, and there were no firm assurances thatthese would be decided in the defendant's favour; and officials in Kuching and Kuala umpur were getting increasingly concerned that the coup pulled off so effectively in June might soon be overturned. the Tunku had seen Syed kechik in actuon and been impressed with what he was to describe to others as his level-headedness. again, Syed Kechik was given carte-blanche to go in and do what he could. This had to be orchestrated with considerable subtlety. The eyes of all Southeast Asia and much ofthe world were now on Kuching. Journalists had flown in from Europe, the United States and elsewhere. There also were suggestions that intelligence agents for the superpowers were scouring about to learn what they could and influence the turn of events in the irrespective favours.It was becoming apparent that the deflection of events in this young state could permanently influence thedirection of political persuasion in theentire region. Everybody knew that something was upin the hitherto quiet Borneo town and thatthe movements in guarded cars, the secret conversations over dinner tables, the ongoing negotiations in the hotel rooms,and the communications between Kuching and Kuala Lumpur were all belied by the calm that seemed to prevail. But even subtlely might have to be abandoned, for Syed Kechik was concerned not so much by the temporary loss of face by Kuala Lumpur as by the permanent damage this could result in for the relationship of the federal govt vis-a-vis all the other states in the federation. Federal leaders had of necessity to keep a low profile in the fray,and Syed Kechik became their main link with the goings-on in Kuching.by virtue of circumstance as much as anything else, he became a central figure in what developed. He was in direct and regular contact with Tun Razak through secret military communication channels. He was the link with Information Dept machinery for the release of statements and speeches. He was the link with the 25 Alliance members of the Council Negeri, exacting their support and ensuring their safety. And he had gained the trust of Swak political leaders. He seems to have been acceptable simply because he was unknown to them. As a stranger, he could approach matters with objectivity, separate from the personal jealousies that had arisen to make them less than fully allied, with each seeking to promote the prominence of his own party. Syed Kechik served as a unifying link between them. His legal mind was useful in the approach to judicial and constitutional matters; his background at the Information Ministry made him aware of the efficacy of the media; he appeared to have extraordinarily good contacts with decision-makers inKL; and he was forceful, bolstering their resolve when it began to flag, insisting on their pesistence in what seemed a hopeless impasse. He was, in essence, running the show, and Tun Razak made no moves regarding Swak without consulting him. But, as in Sabah, he maintained a low profile that reflected outward necessities as much as his personal style. He had a plan, and it was his conviction that whatever the merits or demerits of that plan, if it were carried out secretly and quickly, the end objectives could be achieved. He wanted no interference and when Musa Hitam, by this time the Executive Secretary of UMNO, and Abdullah Ahmad, the political Secretary to Tun Razak, flew in to help he met them at the airport. They told him they were sent in by the Deputy Prime Minister to assist and asked what they were supposed to do. Syed Kechik told them the best way they could help was to get back into the plane and return to Kuala Lumpur. They said that they would await instructions fromtunRazak.Syed Kechik's concern was that their involvement would implicate UMNO and be construed by Ningkan as an attempt by the Malays too put down the Ibans adding fuel to what already was a hot issue. In one session at the Aurora Hotel, they began to expound their notions on howmatters could be resolved. Syed Kechik found these a bit gratuitous. they did not have the basis of two months intensive exposure to politics and personalities in Swak and saw things from a exalted federal viewpoint only. But he was not about to counter their recommendations with an exposition of what he had in mind.He told them that if they thought theycould do better,the they should takeover and he would go back to Jesselton.he preferred to work alone and in secrecy, knowing that involving more people would muddle his efforts.Shortly thereafter,Musa and Abdullah flew back to Kuala Lumpur,doubtless envious of the trust their counterpart had garnered fro Swak politicians, angered by his unwillingness to draw into the arena, and put off by what they regardedas his attempts to increase his own political capital. Of critical importance was maintaining the loyalty of the 25 Alliance members of the Council Negeri.Already, they were growing restless,annoyed by the enforced separation from their wives and families and fearful of the reprisals Ningkan might resort to. But Ningkan's threat we returned against him. These were exploited to justify the continued cloistering of the 25 Council members and enable assertion that the security situation in the state was becoming serious. The real concern, of course, was that crossovers would result not from intimidation,but from offers of cabinet positions and money.SNAP had the financial support of some influential and wealthy Chinese businessmen.Datuk James Wong, one of the SNAP leaders, was himself wealthy,and a few Chinese families had been using all theprties as their pawns,buying influence in each to ensure that they had a stake in govt regardless of the party inpower. In the face of many thousnads of dollar, the integrity ofa man,not wealthy by circumstance and a politician almost by accident could disintegrate. In the media, attention was drawn to the inequities of the govt run by minority: SNAP commanded only 6 seats in the Council Negeri. This was increased subsequently when SUPP with its five seats joined SNAP, but as soon as the partnership was announced, the known infiltration of SUPP by the communists was brought to the fore. Attention was also drawn to the repeated requests of the Sarawak Alliance majority for a meeting of the Council Negeri. Ningkan had his replies to all these and was making other thrusts as well. But since the Sarawak Information Dept was under KL's control, and subject to Syed Kechik's instructions,it was possible to minimise the coverage given to Ningkan's actions and statements. This was criticised as a 'black-out' and had to becountered with a statement from Senu that cited instances of recent coverage of Ningkan in the Swak media. With this impasse that was typifiedby one headline shortly after Ningkan's reinstatement -TAWI SLI CALLS FOR COUNCIL NEGERI: NINGKAN CALLS FOR ELECTIONS- Syed Kechik felt that the only way to get Ningkan out and keep Sarawak in Msia was to have a state of emergency declared. because of Confrontation, emergency regulations were still in force throughout the country, and this in itselfwas sufficient to suspend sconstitutionalprocess in Sarawak by an edict from the Yang DiPertuanAgong. Under section 150 of the Malaysian constitution the federal govt could suspend the Sarawak constitution and appoint an Administrator to administer the government under thePrivy Council,as the country's highest judicial tribunal, decided on the appeal regarding the rightful Chief minister or until the people of the state selected their respresentatives at the forthcoming general elections. The problem with this,however, was that it would open a constitutional wound for an extended period,and even when political stabilities long into the future. One of the first things he did was to get copies from the Information Dept of every speech Ningkan had made since assuming office in 1963 - on education, on language, on relations with Kuala lumpur, on the Spore separation, on confrontation, on his partners in Sarawak Alliance, on the role of the Chief Minister. These were selectively excerpted abd applied in a campaign to discredit Ningkan in the minds of the piublic. Syed Kechik also renewes his efforts to bolster the public image of the Tawi Sli govr. But equal in importance to these media efforts was krrping track of the legal prooceedings Ningkan had initiated in cooperation with expartriate officials. Swak politicians, given their lack of experience, were somewhat aewd by the power of judicial process, ans this was undermining their confidence. Only Taib, who had studied lae in Australia was secure in confronting expartriate officials with the powers of the new govt, and it concerned Syed Kechik that the young state minister was rising so quickly, especially since Taib sis not enjoy the support of his Alliance partners becauase of having shattered their trust on several previous occasions. The suit filed by Ningkan to challenge the constitutionality of the Governor's dismissal action was to be preliminarily heard in the High Court of Borneo onm August 22; and the request for a restraining order to prevent Tawi Sli and his cabinet from acting as ministers, on Aug 25. notice had been issued on Aug 12 fro convening a Council Negeri meeting, but given the rwquirement for 14 days' notice, this could only br held on Aug 26. Syed Kechik saw this as unfortunate. A series of actions could previously have been taken in the Council egeri to abticipate and diffuse the ploys taken by Ningkan but the opportunity might by this time have been lost. If the rulingd of the Chief Justice of Borneo were to render the identity of ministers sub judice, this would act as a bar to convening the Council Negeri until the question eas fully resolved and accepted by both parties without apperal or until the Councul Negeri has to meet by lae, and this would not ve until December, whichever came earlier. That is exactly what happened. Chief JusticeR. R. Harley ruled in the preliminary hearing that ningkan's suit against the governor and Tawi Sli would be heard on Agust 29, rendering the identity of the Chief Minister subjudice. when the Council Negeri sat on August 26, the session lasted a mere seven minutes. The Speaker, referring to the ban on debate on which a decision is pending as a result of civil suits, stated that because the business of the Council Negeri could not be transacted without the paerticipation of ministers and because he was not in a position to know who the rightful ministers were, he had no choice but to adjourn the Council. Interestingly, Ningkan has the previous day agreed to drop the suits if the Council Negeri were dissolved in anticipation of elections - but wioth electoral support for Ningkan growing, with the ompossibility of demarcating new constituencies uickly, and the unacceptavility of holding elections ubder the old three-tier system which enabled non-malaysians to vote, this had again to be rejected. An impasse was developing to Ningkan's advantage, and sonmething had to be sine to break it. Syed Kechik saw that if the courts were to deliver a final jusgement in ningkan's favour, little could be done to comple Ningkan to convene the Council negeri immediately. According to the Sarawak constitution, the Cuncil could be convened only on the ibstruction of the state cabinet, of which Ningkan would again be head, to the Govenor. instead of doing this, Ningkan would try to coerce some of his opponents, who by this time numbered 25, with cabinet posts and other incentives in an effort to regain a majority. if this were unsuccessful, he would call for elections, making full use of govt machinery to popularize himself, and bring in political strategists from outside the state. It was also felt that Ningkan and his SNAP supporters together with SUPP would prepare for seccession ansd possibly a link-up with Spore. Even if Ningkan lost the case, he would simply appeal and thereby prevent the sitting of the Council until December, paving the way for his exploitation of an increasingly volatile situation. An alternative plan had to be developed, and Syed Kechik saw this as residing in the Sarawak constitution. the gaps in the constitution which made it impossible for the chief Minister to be dismissed and for the Council Negeri to be converned, even though the chief Minister did not have majority support, had to be closed. this could be done by Kuala Lumpur's suspension of constitutional process in the state. To begin to set the stage for such federal action, Syed Kechik drafted statements for release to the press onAug 28 regarding the gravity of the security situation because of ploiticla tensions and the communist treat. A petition was sent by the Council negeri members to the Yang Dipertuan Agong (The King of Malaysia) and copied to the Prime Minister, in which the events were recounted of the preceding two-and-one-half months, the legal aspects were setailed of the likely suspension of constitutional govt because of tyhis impasse in the courts and a request was made for special action to preserve security and prevent administrative chaos. A similar petition was sent to the Governor, and on the smae day a letter was drafted for Tan Sri Jugah's signature, making yet another appeal to the Governor. Kuala Lumpue was understandably reluctant to act with a heavy hand at this moment, particularly becausr the judgement in the case against the Govenor and Taiwi Sli had not been delivered. Chief Justice Harley heard the case on Aug 29 and set Spet 7 as the date for judgement. Matters were thus temporarily in abyance. As a precaution against Ningklan's persuading fence-sitters to join his forces before the judgement was rendered, the 25 members of the Council Negeri were flown to Kuala Lumpur to ensure that they would remain resolute in their backing of the Tawi SLi govt. A wwwk later, on Spet 6, they flew back to Kuching, accompnaied by Syed Kechik and were kept incommunicado. Some were put up at the govt rest house at Rubber Road; some at Tan Sri Jugah's residence, some at Arif Hotel. All were under Police protection. When this was initially requested, Police Commissioner Roy Henry refused and was immediately overruled by Kuala Lumpur. A senior police officer from Kuala Lumpur has earlier been posted to Kuching as Deputy Commissioner tp endure Saeawak police follow federal instructions abd he gave the order for protection. Eveb so, late on the eve of the judgement, Niongkan and some of his men were able to contact foyur Alliance members, alledgedly threatening them with jail if they did not suipport him. Kana was also cajoled and threatened with anonymous telephone messages receiving offers of $25,000 to switch sides and being told that hislife would be in danger if he refused. The next morning, Chief Justice Harley handed down his judgement in Ningkan's favour and Ningkan was reinstated as Chief Minister. Dyed Kechik immediately got on to Tun Razak to say that Ningkan has to be brought down at whatever cost - finacial or constitutional. He was sent $20,000 to cover the expenses of ministers who has to move out of govt houses and of Council Negeri members who had to be cloistered until matters were resolved. The public strategy was to call for a meeting of the Council Negeri so that a motion of no confidence could be passed against Ningkan. Syed Kechik drafted letters to the Governor for the 25 Alliance members and for Tawi Sli, rwquesting that such a meeting be convened. The Governor was then advised to send an official rwquest to Nongkan that the Council be convened. Ningkan presictably refused, citing the article of the Sarawak constitution which provided for the Council's being called oly by a request to the Governor from the state cabinrt, and stated that such a rwquest was bnot forthcoming. Repeated appeals for a MEETING OF THE cOUNCIL nEGERI WERE MADE BY THE sARAWAK aLLIANCE MEMBERS AND HIGHLY PUBLICIZED IN ORDER TO BUILD UP PUBLIC OPINION AGAINST nINGKAN'S ACTIONS AND POTRAY THESE AS PREJUDICIAL TO DEMOCRATIC PROCESS. nINGKAN launched counter-moves, filing a suit against Tawi Sli for alleged misapproprioation of state funds in his recent unsuccessful defence. The speaker remained neutral, stating that he waspowerless to do more than simply pass on the Governor's request to the Chief Minister and inform him that by estavlished convention it was the responsibility of the govt to accede to a demand from the opposition to allot one day on the CouncilNegeri for the discussion of a motion expressing lack of confidence. Syed Kechik knew these official and public efforts to be futilr, but nevertheless necessary as smokescreen for what would follow. The longer Ningkan was in power, the greater was rhe likehood of his coopting some of hos opponents. Syed Kechik rhus renewed hisplans for suspending the constitution to enable realizing the desired pobjectives. The alternative was to amend, rather than suspend the Sarawak constitution in order to give the govt discretion in summoning the Council Negeri and the power to dismiss a Chief Minister who had lost the confidence of the Council. This could havebeen doneunder the prevailing stae of emergency which gave Parliament legislative authority over the state bodies and the power to rewrite the state constitutions at its will.But this would have been arbitrary and without real basis. It would,moreover, have set a dangerous precedent and scared the state govts in the other twelve states. If however, it were demonstated that security in the state was steadily degenerating and that democratic process of the minority,then the federal govt would have greater justification for action.In fact, the security situation was not that serious, but it had the potential to become serious,and with the SNAP-SUPP partnership,Swak politics were taking on a distinctly secessionist bent.SUPP had beenagainst Malaysiasince 1961,andit was seen by many as the political front for Swak's ClandestineCommunist organisation (CCO). The real danger, then, resided not on the streets,but in the machinations of minority politicians. The stage had been set by press releases in late August, emphasising the gravity of the security situation in the state. These were followed, after the reinstatement of Ningkan, by report of threats to the safety of the 25 Sarawak Alliance members of the Council Negeri and embellished with expressions of concern that their constituents might retaliate openly against the supporters of Ningkan.It was known that two bus loads of Ibans from the Second Division,the heartland of support for Ningkan and SNAP, had come into Kuching, replete with war dress,spears, swords,and shotguns, and were assembled at Ningkan'shouse. The bloodshed that seemed imminent had to be supplantted by the simulated. On September 14, Syed Kechik reported to Tun Razak through his military channels that SUPP and SNAP had agreed to make a united stand with a common platform in thecoming elections and that their support in the state was growing. He reported also that there was a possibility of some demonstrations being staged in kuching that very day. Indeed, these were already being planned. Leaflets denouncing Ningkan with allegations that SNAPand the communists in SUPP would "kill" democracy in Swak were distributed throughout Kuching. A demonstration was organised at Pangkalan Batu across from the Astana, where hundreds assembled to proclaim their support for Tawi Sli and the Sarawak Alliance govt. Although such assemblies were strictly illegal under the emergency regulations, the police had been informed of the benign intent and asked to stay out of it. As frosting to all this,some Barjasa supporters engaged in a bit of vandalism later that evening, breaking the window of a few establishments in Kuching to reflect anti-British and anti-Ningkan sentiment. And reports on the tense security situation had been circulating for some days. Thetension wasreal; the manifestations of it, contrived. But the federal govt had the justification it needed for fresh and radical action. On the morning of Sept 15, a state of emergency was declared in Swak, and the gaps in the Swak constitution would soon befilled. Ningkan had been caught flat-footed; he had underestimated his local opponents and the extent to which the federal govt would go; he hadf assumed all along, and erroneously, that their only recourse was to appeal theHigh Court'sdecision which, although suspending the activities of theCouncil Negeri, would serve ultimately to work in his favour by giving him time to manoeuvre. Onceagain, he advised the Governor to dissolve the Council Negeri and to call for general elections. And once again, the Governor declined. As a last gasp effort, Ningkan cabled the residents of the five divisions into whichj the state is administratively divided and instructed them to call for meetings of the old three-tier system, on Sept 26 so that early elections could be discussed and their confidence from four of the five District Advisory Councils and use this as a legitimate basis in his quest to stay in power. But even theis effort wasd anticipated and pre-empted. At an emergency session of Parliament on Sept 19, two amendments to the Swak constitution were tabled and enacted, giving the Governor powers to convene the Council Negeri on a direct appeal from Council Negeri members. Speeches were delivered in Parliament by Swak members Thomas Kana and Rahman Yakub to thank the federal govt for itrs swift and appropriate action, and explanatory messages were the media. The governor did not dismiss Ningkan straightaway, hoever. To create a greater air of the legitimate workings of democracy, he called for a meeting of the CouncilNegeri on Sept 23, at which the no confidencemotion was passed to enable Ningkan's dissmisal the following day. In the interim between the declaration of emergency and the sitting of the CouncilNegeri,Syedkechik drafted statements topalliate the sensibilities of a bewildered populace. Communications in the stae were poor,and people outside Kuching hadlittle idea of the actual picture there except for that presented by the Information Dept,which in light of the envisioned objectives was one of chaos. This quickly had to be reversed to assure everybody in the state that things were back to normal and that security was well in hand-allcombined with a bit of applause for the federal and the Swak Alliance for their sensible handling of the crisis. The campaign to improve the image of Tawi Sli began anew and as had been done in Sabah after the exit of Stephens, the emphasis shifted immediately to the concerns of development in order to divert attention from the recent political events. With the prospect of Tawi Sli's reinstatement, there was a fair amount of jockeying between the four Swak Alliance partners for power- specifically for the ministerial appointments in the new govt. Since pesaka and Barjasa stood firm in their desire to topple Ningkan, the balance tipped in their favour. PANAS and the SCA, having wavered, saw their positions eroded as punishment for backing the status quo. But from these negotiations, Syed Kechik stayed away. Except for some general recommendations offered to Taib,rahman, Kana and Tan Sri Jugah on the need for fair treatment of PANAS and SCA, the actual choices were theirs.It was sufficient that political sentiment in Sarawak had been deflected towards Kuala lumpur.Years later, he would realised that the spectre of fragmentation was more real than it seemed and recall Kana's telling him on the day of the swearing in of the new cabinet that Ningkan's ouster would not have happened without him. Perhaps not, but at the time,his attentions had already shifted to events elsewhere.he left Kuching that evening for Jesselton.