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[sangkancil] Henry Kissinger: Where do we go from here?
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The Washington Post
Where Do We Go From Here?
By Henry Kissinger
Tuesday, November 6, 2001; Page A23
As the war against the Taliban gathers momentum, it is
important to see it in its proper perspective.
President Bush has eloquently described the objective
as the destruction of state-supported terrorism. And
for all its novelty, the new warfare permits a clear
definition of victory.
The terrorists are ruthless, but not numerous. They
control no territory permanently. If their activities
are harassed by the security forces of all countries
-- if no country will harbor them -- they will become
outlaws and increasingly obliged to devote efforts to
elemental survival. If they attempt to commandeer a
part of a country, as has happened to some extent in
Afghanistan and Colombia, they can be hunted down by
military operations. The key to anti-terrorism
strategy is to eliminate safe havens.
These safe havens come about in various ways. In some
countries, domestic legislation or constitutional
restraints inhibit surveillance unless there are
demonstrated criminal acts, or they prevent
transmitting what is ostensibly domestic intelligence
to other countries -- as seems to be the case in
Germany and, to some extent, the United States.
Remedial measures with respect to these situations are
in train.
But the overwhelming majority of safe havens occur
when a government closes its eyes because it agrees
with at least some of the objectives of the terrorists
-- as in Afghanistan, to some extent in Iran and Syria
and, until recently, in Pakistan. Even ostensibly
friendly countries that have been cooperating with the
United States on general strategy, such as Saudi
Arabia, sometimes make a tacit bargain with terrorists
so long as terrorist actions are not directed against
the host government.
A serious anti-terrorism campaign must break this
nexus. Many of the host governments know more than
they were prepared to communicate before Sept. 11.
Incentives must be created for the sharing of
intelligence. The anti-terrorism campaign must improve
security cooperation, interrupt the flow of funds,
harass terrorist communications and subject the
countries that provide safe haven to pressures
including, in the extreme case, military pressure.
In the aftermath of the attack on American soil, the
Bush administration resisted arguments urging
immediate military action against known terrorist
centers. Instead, Secretary of State Colin Powell very
skillfully brought about a global coalition that
legitimized the use of military power against
Afghanistan, the most flagrant provider of a safe
haven for the most egregious symbol of international
terrorism, Osama bin Laden.
The strategy of focusing on Afghanistan carries with
it two risks, however. The first is that the inherent
complexities of a trackless geography and chaotic
political system may divert the coalition from the
ultimate objective of crippling international
terrorism. Though the elimination of bin Laden and his
network and associates will be a significant symbolic
achievement, it will be only the opening engagement of
what must be viewed as a continuing and relentless
worldwide campaign. The second challenge is to guard
against the temptation to treat cooperation on
Afghanistan as meeting the challenge and to use it as
an alibi for avoiding the necessary succeeding phases.
This is why military operations in Afghanistan should
be limited to the shattering of the Taliban and
disintegration of the bin Laden network. Using U.S.
military forces for nation-building or pacifying the
entire country would involve us in a quagmire
comparable to what drained the Soviet Union. The
conventional wisdom of creating a broadly based
coalition to govern Afghanistan is desirable but not
encouraged by the historical record. The likely --
perhaps optimum -- outcome is a central Kabul
government of limited reach, with tribal autonomy
prevailing in the various regions. This essential
enterprise should be put under the aegis of the United
Nations, with generous economic support from the
United States and other advanced industrial countries.
A contact group could be created composed of
Afghanistan's neighbors (minus Iraq), India, the
United States and those NATO allies that participated
in the military operations. This would provide a
mechanism to reintroduce Iran to the international
system, provided it genuinely abandons its support of
terrorism.
The crucial phase of America's anti-terrorism strategy
will begin as the Afghanistan military campaign winds
down, and its focus will have to be outside
Afghanistan. At that point, the coalition will come
under strain.
So far the issue of long-term goals has been avoided
by the formula that members of the global coalition
are free to choose the degree of their involvement. A
la carte coalition management worked well when
membership required little more than affirming
opposition to terrorism in principle. Its continued
usefulness will depend on how coalition obligations
are defined in the next phase. Should the convoy move
at the pace of the slowest ship or should some parts
of it be able to sail by themselves? If the former,
the coalition effort will gradually be defined by the
least-common-denominator compromises that killed the
U.N. inspection system in Iraq and are on the verge of
eliminating the U.N. sanctions against that country.
Alternatively, the coalition can be conceived as a
group united by common objectives but permitting
autonomous action by whatever consensus can be created
-- or, in the extreme case, by the United States
alone.
Those who argue for the widest possible coalition --
in other words, for a coalition veto -- often cite the
experience of the Gulf War. But the differences are
significant. The Gulf War was triggered by a clear
case of aggression that threatened Saudi Arabia, whose
security has been deemed crucial by a bipartisan
succession of American presidents. The United States
decided to undo Saddam's adventure in the few months
available before the summer heat made large-scale
ground operations impossible. Several hundred thousand
American troops were dispatched before any attempt at
coalition building was undertaken. Since the United
States would obviously act alone if necessary,
participating in the coalition became the most
effective means for influencing events.
The direction of the current coalition is more
ambiguous. President Bush has frequently and
forcefully emphasized that he is determined to press
the anti-terrorism campaign beyond Afghanistan. In due
course he will supplement his policy pronouncements
with specific proposals. That will be the point at
which the scope of the operational coalition will
become clear. There could be disagreement on what
constitutes a terrorist safe haven; what measures
states should take to cut off the flow of funds; what
penalties there are for noncompliance; in what manner,
whether and by whom force should be used.
Just as, in the Gulf War, the pressures for American
unilateral action provided the cement to bring a
coalition together, so, in the anti-terrorism war,
American determination and that of allies of
comparable views are needed. A firm strategy becomes
all the more important as biological weapons appear to
have entered the arsenals of terrorism. Preventive
action is becoming imperative. States known to possess
such facilities and to have previously used them must
be obliged to open themselves to strict, conclusive
international inspections with obligatory enforcement
mechanisms. This applies particularly to Iraq, with
its long history of threats to all its neighbors and
the use of chemical weapons.
The conditions of international support for a firm
policy exist. The attack on the United States has
produced an extraordinary congruence of interests
among the major powers. None wants to be vulnerable to
shadowy groups that have emerged, from Southeast Asia
to the edge of Europe. Few have the means to resist
alone. The NATO allies have ended the debate about
whether, after the end of the Cold War, there is still
a need for an Atlantic security structure. Our Asian
allies, Japan and Korea, being democratic and
industrialized, share this conviction. India,
profoundly threatened by domestic Islamic
fundamentalism, has much to lose by abandoning a
common course. Russia perceives a common interest due
to its contiguous Islamic southern regions. China
shares a similar concern with respect to its western
regions and has an added incentive to bring an end to
global terrorism well before the 2008 Olympics in
Beijing. Paradoxically, terrorism has evoked a sense
of world community that has eluded theoretical pleas
for world order.
In the Islamic world, attitudes are more ambiguous.
Many Islamic nations, though deeply concerned about
fundamentalism, are constrained by their public
opinion from avowing public support, and a few may
sympathize with some aspects of the terrorist agenda.
An understanding American attitude toward traditional
friends of America, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, is
appropriate. Their leaders are quite well aware that
they have made compromises imposed on them by brutal
domestic necessities. The administration clearly
should make every effort to help them overcome these
circumstances, to improve intelligence sharing and the
control of money flows. But it must not undermine
these governments, for in the short term, any
foreseeable alternative would be worse for our
interests and for the peoples involved.
Yet there are limits beyond which a serious policy
cannot go. There is no reason for treating as members
of the coalition countries whose state- supported
media advocate and justify terrorism, withhold
intelligence vital to the security of potential
victims and permit terrorist groups to operate from
their territory.
These considerations apply especially to Iran.
Geopolitics argues for improved U.S.-Iranian
relations. To welcome Iran into an anti-terrorism
coalition has as a prerequisite the abandonment of its
current role as the leading supporter of global
terrorism as both the State Department and the
bipartisan Bremer Commission have reported. An Iranian
relationship with the West can prosper only when both
sides feel the need for it. Both sides -- and not only
the West -- must make fundamental choices. The same is
true to a somewhat lesser degree of Syria.
The war on terrorism is not just about hunting down
terrorists. It is, above all, to protect the
extraordinary opportunity that has come about to
recast the international system. The North Atlantic
nations, having understood their common dangers, can
turn to a new definition of common purposes. Relations
with former adversaries can go beyond liquidating the
vestiges of the Cold War and find a new role for
Russia in its post-imperial phase, and for China as it
emerges into great power status. India is emerging as
an important global player. After measurable success
in the anti-terrorism campaign, when it does not
appear as concession to the terrorists, the Middle
East peace process should be urgently resumed. These
and other prospects must not be allowed to vanish
because those that have the ability to prevail shrink
from what their opportunities require.
The writer, a former secretary of state, is president
of Kissinger Associates, an international consulting
firm.
© 2001, Los Angeles Times Syndicate International
© 2001 The Washington Post Company
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