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FEER: Courting Danger: Gus Dur's Inner Circle of Influence-Peddlers (fwd)
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- Subject: FEER: Courting Danger: Gus Dur's Inner Circle of Influence-Peddlers (fwd)
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- Date: Sat, 4 Mar 2000 08:46:09 +0800 (MYT)
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---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: 03 Mar 2000 08:12:59
From: tapol@gn.apc.org
Reply-To: "Conference act.indonesia" <indonesia-act@igc.org>
To: Recipients of indonesia-act <indonesia-act@igc.org>
Subject: FEER: Courting Danger: Gus Dur's Inner Circle of Influence-Peddlers
From: TAPOL <tapol@gn.apc.org>
Subject: FEER: Courting Danger: Gus Dur's Inner Circle of Influence-Peddlers
Received from Joyo Indonesian News
Far Eastern Economic Review
Issue cover-dated March 9, 2000
INDONESIA
COURTING DANGER
President Wahid overcame a major hurdle when he dismissed Gen. Wiranto. Now
he needs to counter concern that a new Javanese court of influence-peddlers
and business friends is forming around him.
By John McBeth in Jakarta
For both admirers and critics of Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid, the
picture is disturbing: At the presidential palace in Jakarta there are signs
of a new "royal court" in the making. Officials converse in Javanese, not the
national language Bahasa Indonesia; Wahid himself borrows from mysticism and
ancient tracts to plot political strategy; and family and friends are acting
as gatekeepers and facilitators, in some cases for businessmen hoping to
curry favour.
Some analysts describe it as a form of "benign Suhartoism," a throwback to
the disastrous last decade of President Suharto's 32-year rule. Benign or
not, the legitimacy and relative stability Wahid has brought to a nation
exhausted by two years of economic and social upheaval continues to be
overshadowed by leadership shortcomings that create space for would-be
cronies. Left unchecked, these could threaten his reputation as a man of
principle and democratic ideals.
The concern stems from several factors. These include the roles being played
by Wahid's children and a decision to separate the palace from other parts of
the administration. At the centre of it all is Wahid's personal manner. His
diffident, laissez-faire style may work to disarm rivals, but it shows signs
of hurting his government's relationship with the International Monetary Fund
and domestic allies. Wahid's willingness to meet with heavily indebted
businessmen--in particular, textile tycoon Marimutu Sinivasan, who owes the
government $1 billion--is fuelling notions that such people receive special
protection. In private, some palace officials express serious concern.
Then there's the president's apparent inability to bluntly say "no." Critics
say his vagueness and reluctance to confront others encourages businessmen to
seek favour and leads investigators to be careful about the businessmen they
pursue.
While the president's near-blindness makes him dependent on his inner circle
for information and advice, there is an additional dimension: a resurgence in
the business activities of the Nahdlatul Ulama--the Muslim mass organization
that still serves as Wahid's power base--and the resurrection of two business
groups that supported Wahid during his 16 years at the NU's helm.
By any measure, the task he has in forging a new future for Indonesia and
escaping old political ways is formidable. Saddled with a cabinet thrust upon
him by the necessities of accommodating widely diverging political interests,
he has had a difficult baptism. During the first four months of his
presidency, his attention has been consumed by the twin tasks of removing
former armed-forces chief Gen. Wiranto from his positions of influence and
the need to warn off the retired generals and Muslim radicals Wahid holds
responsible for outbreaks of unrest across the country.
In part, this explains the president's lack of progress in fixing the economy
and initiating urgent reforms, particularly in the justice system. But
further delay could heighten perceptions that the transition is proving
unduly long and difficult and, perhaps more worryingly, allow a resurgence of
some of the old habits that people thought had died with the Suharto era.
Political scientist Cornelius Luhulima, a long-time acquaintance of Wahid,
says a lack of democratic institutions--and a parliament he appears to have
little faith in--makes it difficult for the president to lead in a
conventional sense. But critics point out that by falling back on this
traditional Javanese pattern of leadership, which emphasizes the wisdom of
the leader, Wahid ensures that everything comes back to him--just as it did
with Suharto. He runs the government in much the same erratic, personalized
manner he has used at the Nahdlatul Ulama.
Although Wahid has recovered from last year's serious stroke, some of his
wilder statements suggest he often has a loose grip on reality. "He likes
people giving him information," says Greg Fealy, an Australian scholar and an
expert on the 30 million-strong NU. "But he can have six people giving him
sound information and a seventh person telling him something that tickles his
fancy--and that's the one he believes. It's the mystic in him. He wants
something that stimulates him." Little wonder that an Indonesian newspaper
recently noted in an editorial that Wahid "has been very skilful in solving
problems created by himself."
In the first weeks of his presidency, Wahid's aides were drawn into the fight
to end what one describes as a "psychological war" against the military's
suffocating hold over the palace. Mostly, it was about separating the palace
staff from other departments in the State Secretariat, the body that handles
the executive's administrative chores. In fact, what has emerged is a
throwback to the days of founding President Sukarno, whose fiercely loyal
staff proved impervious to outside interference. This separation of the
palace from other parts of the administration has become a key worry for
those who see in its independence the makings of a new royal court.
Then there are those who surround Wahid, and on whom the near-blind cleric
relies. Many of the early skirmishes of his administration were fought by
tough-minded Ratih Hardjono, 39. A relative and former journalist, she served
as Wahid's personal assistant during general elections last year and in the
lead-up to his unexpected presidential coup. More recently, newly promoted
State Secretary Bondon Goenawan and Cabinet Secretary Marsilam Simanjuntuk
have joined her. The two are former members of Democracy Forum, an activist
group Wahid headed in the early 1990s.
Although they have no official positions, Alisa, 27, and Zannuba (or Yenny),
24, two of the president's daughters, serve as his eyes and ears. They read
to him, interpret the body language of the people he talks to--not always
accurately, according to one annoyed ambassador--and act as his gatekeepers.
Questions about Wahid's reliance on them and Yenny's role, in particular,
surfaced after three of the president's aides were called to a parliamentary
hearing to explain, among other things, the source of information he has been
receiving.
The president also depends a lot on his brothers. Hasyim Wahid offers advice
and acts as a channel for businessmen and other visitors. He also interprets
Wahid's dreams, according to insiders. Another brother, Salehudin, is what an
acquaintance calls the "family conscience" while a third, Umar, a well-liked
pulmonary specialist, serves as the coordinator of the president's medical
team. "To keep Gus Dur healthy," Umar has told friends, using Wahid's
nickname, "is to keep him busy."
Not everyone thinks having the family around the president is so bad. Says
Maritime Affairs Minister Sarwono Kusumaatmadja: "If you're blind, what else
can you do. I'd rely on my kids and no-one else--even if they don't have
formal positions."
Much of the criticism stems from the fact that unlike the authoritarian
Suharto, Wahid wants to encourage his ministers to think and act for
themselves. But by not providing his cabinet with either guidance or
direction, he has instead created the impression of policy drift and
political stagnation. Working in the Wahid government, intones Sarwono, "is
like walking on a bed of treacle--laborious, with hardly any real progress."
Describing a picture of inexperienced ministers unwilling to play at high
stakes and groping through a maze of bureaucracy, Sarwono bemoans the
shortage of what he calls "movers and shakers" and "predator types." More
importantly, he says, the president needs to strengthen
macro-management--"he's got to have someone who can run the government on a
day-to-day basis and go after implementation, something like a prime
minister."
So what of the future? Political analyst Marcus Mietzner sees little prospect
of the situation changing: "Abdurrahman Wahid will be around for some
time--providing biology and tuhan [God] don't intervene." But, he adds, that
assumes continuing weakness in the country's political parties and the
absence, for now, of a credible alternative.
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign
111 Northwood Road, Thornton Heath,
Surrey CR7 8HW, UK
Phone: 0181 771-2904 Fax: 0181 653-0322
email: tapol@gn.apc.org
Internet: www.gn.apc.org/tapol
Campaigning to expose human rights violations in
Indonesia, East Timor, West Papua and Aceh
26 years - and still going strong
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++