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FEER: Courting Danger: Gus Dur's Inner Circle of Influence-Peddlers (fwd)





---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: 03 Mar 2000 08:12:59
From: tapol@gn.apc.org
Reply-To: "Conference act.indonesia" <indonesia-act@igc.org>
To: Recipients of indonesia-act <indonesia-act@igc.org>
Subject: FEER: Courting Danger: Gus Dur's Inner Circle of  Influence-Peddlers

From: TAPOL <tapol@gn.apc.org>
Subject: FEER: Courting Danger: Gus Dur's Inner Circle of  Influence-Peddlers

Received from Joyo Indonesian News

Far Eastern Economic Review
Issue cover-dated March 9, 2000 

INDONESIA

COURTING DANGER

President Wahid overcame a major hurdle when he dismissed Gen. Wiranto. Now 
he needs to counter concern that a new Javanese court of influence-peddlers 
and business friends is forming around him. 

By John McBeth in Jakarta

For both admirers and critics of Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid, the 
picture is disturbing: At the presidential palace in Jakarta there are signs 
of a new "royal court" in the making. Officials converse in Javanese, not the 
national language Bahasa Indonesia; Wahid himself borrows from mysticism and 
ancient tracts to plot political strategy; and family and friends are acting 
as gatekeepers and facilitators, in some cases for businessmen hoping to 
curry favour.

Some analysts describe it as a form of "benign Suhartoism," a throwback to 
the disastrous last decade of President Suharto's 32-year rule. Benign or 
not, the legitimacy and relative stability Wahid has brought to a nation 
exhausted by two years of economic and social upheaval continues to be 
overshadowed by leadership shortcomings that create space for would-be 
cronies. Left unchecked, these could threaten his reputation as a man of 
principle and democratic ideals.

The concern stems from several factors. These include the roles being played 
by Wahid's children and a decision to separate the palace from other parts of 
the administration. At the centre of it all is Wahid's personal manner. His 
diffident, laissez-faire style may work to disarm rivals, but it shows signs 
of hurting his government's relationship with the International Monetary Fund 
and domestic allies. Wahid's willingness to meet with heavily indebted 
businessmen--in particular, textile tycoon Marimutu Sinivasan, who owes the 
government $1 billion--is fuelling notions that such people receive special 
protection. In private, some palace officials express serious concern. 

Then there's the president's apparent inability to bluntly say "no." Critics 
say his vagueness and reluctance to confront others encourages businessmen to 
seek favour and leads investigators to be careful about the businessmen they 
pursue.

While the president's near-blindness makes him dependent on his inner circle 
for information and advice, there is an additional dimension: a resurgence in 
the business activities of the Nahdlatul Ulama--the Muslim mass organization 
that still serves as Wahid's power base--and the resurrection of two business 
groups that supported Wahid during his 16 years at the NU's helm.

By any measure, the task he has in forging a new future for Indonesia and 
escaping old political ways is formidable. Saddled with a cabinet thrust upon 
him by the necessities of accommodating widely diverging political interests, 
he has had a difficult baptism. During the first four months of his 
presidency, his attention has been consumed by the twin tasks of removing 
former armed-forces chief Gen. Wiranto from his positions of influence and 
the need to warn off the retired generals and Muslim radicals Wahid holds 
responsible for outbreaks of unrest across the country.

In part, this explains the president's lack of progress in fixing the economy 
and initiating urgent reforms, particularly in the justice system. But 
further delay could heighten perceptions that the transition is proving 
unduly long and difficult and, perhaps more worryingly, allow a resurgence of 
some of the old habits that people thought had died with the Suharto era. 

Political scientist Cornelius Luhulima, a long-time acquaintance of Wahid, 
says a lack of democratic institutions--and a parliament he appears to have 
little faith in--makes it difficult for the president to lead in a 
conventional sense. But critics point out that by falling back on this 
traditional Javanese pattern of leadership, which emphasizes the wisdom of 
the leader, Wahid ensures that everything comes back to him--just as it did 
with Suharto. He runs the government in much the same erratic, personalized 
manner he has used at the Nahdlatul Ulama.

Although Wahid has recovered from last year's serious stroke, some of his 
wilder statements suggest he often has a loose grip on reality. "He likes 
people giving him information," says Greg Fealy, an Australian scholar and an 
expert on the 30 million-strong NU. "But he can have six people giving him 
sound information and a seventh person telling him something that tickles his 
fancy--and that's the one he believes. It's the mystic in him. He wants 
something that stimulates him." Little wonder that an Indonesian newspaper 
recently noted in an editorial that Wahid "has been very skilful in solving 
problems created by himself."

In the first weeks of his presidency, Wahid's aides were drawn into the fight 
to end what one describes as a "psychological war" against the military's 
suffocating hold over the palace. Mostly, it was about separating the palace 
staff from other departments in the State Secretariat, the body that handles 
the executive's administrative chores. In fact, what has emerged is a 
throwback to the days of founding President Sukarno, whose fiercely loyal 
staff proved impervious to outside interference. This separation of the 
palace from other parts of the administration has become a key worry for 
those who see in its independence the makings of a new royal court.

Then there are those who surround Wahid, and on whom the near-blind cleric 
relies. Many of the early skirmishes of his administration were fought by 
tough-minded Ratih Hardjono, 39. A relative and former journalist, she served 
as Wahid's personal assistant during general elections last year and in the 
lead-up to his unexpected presidential coup. More recently, newly promoted 
State Secretary Bondon Goenawan and Cabinet Secretary Marsilam Simanjuntuk 
have joined her. The two are former members of Democracy Forum, an activist 
group Wahid headed in the early 1990s. 

Although they have no official positions, Alisa, 27, and Zannuba (or Yenny), 
24, two of the president's daughters, serve as his eyes and ears. They read 
to him, interpret the body language of the people he talks to--not always 
accurately, according to one annoyed ambassador--and act as his gatekeepers. 
Questions about Wahid's reliance on them and Yenny's role, in particular, 
surfaced after three of the president's aides were called to a parliamentary 
hearing to explain, among other things, the source of information he has been 
receiving. 

The president also depends a lot on his brothers. Hasyim Wahid offers advice 
and acts as a channel for businessmen and other visitors. He also interprets 
Wahid's dreams, according to insiders. Another brother, Salehudin, is what an 
acquaintance calls the "family conscience" while a third, Umar, a well-liked 
pulmonary specialist, serves as the coordinator of the president's medical 
team. "To keep Gus Dur healthy," Umar has told friends, using Wahid's 
nickname, "is to keep him busy."

Not everyone thinks having the family around the president is so bad. Says 
Maritime Affairs Minister Sarwono Kusumaatmadja: "If you're blind, what else 
can you do. I'd rely on my kids and no-one else--even if they don't have 
formal positions." 

Much of the criticism stems from the fact that unlike the authoritarian 
Suharto, Wahid wants to encourage his ministers to think and act for 
themselves. But by not providing his cabinet with either guidance or 
direction, he has instead created the impression of policy drift and 
political stagnation. Working in the Wahid government, intones Sarwono, "is 
like walking on a bed of treacle--laborious, with hardly any real progress." 

Describing a picture of inexperienced ministers unwilling to play at high 
stakes and groping through a maze of bureaucracy, Sarwono bemoans the 
shortage of what he calls "movers and shakers" and "predator types." More 
importantly, he says, the president needs to strengthen 
macro-management--"he's got to have someone who can run the government on a 
day-to-day basis and go after implementation, something like a prime 
minister." 

So what of the future? Political analyst Marcus Mietzner sees little prospect 
of the situation changing: "Abdurrahman Wahid will be around for some 
time--providing biology and tuhan [God] don't intervene." But, he adds, that 
assumes continuing weakness in the country's political parties and the 
absence, for now, of a credible alternative. 

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign
111 Northwood Road, Thornton Heath,
Surrey CR7 8HW, UK
Phone: 0181 771-2904   Fax: 0181 653-0322
email: tapol@gn.apc.org
Internet: www.gn.apc.org/tapol
Campaigning to expose human rights violations in
Indonesia, East Timor, West Papua and Aceh

26 years - and still going strong 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++