JP: Reshuffle mainly for reform or consolidation? (fwd)

["M.G.G. Pillai" <pillai@mgg.pc.my>]

---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: 29 Feb 2000 07:41:10
From: tapol@gn.apc.org
Reply-To: "Conference act.indonesia" <indonesia-act@igc.org>
To: Recipients of indonesia-act <indonesia-act@igc.org>
Subject: JP: Reshuffle mainly for reform or consolidation?

From: TAPOL <tapol@gn.apc.org>
Subject: JP: Reshuffle mainly for reform or consolidation?

Received from Joyo Indonesian News

also: JP Editorial: No routine tours

Jakarta Post
February 29, 2000 

Editorials and Opinions

Reshuffle for reform? 'More likely for elite consolidation'

Will there be more reform in the Indonesian Military (TNI) following Monday's 
reshuffle? The Jakarta Post spoke to Kusnanto Anggoro, who studies security 
issues at the Center for Strategic International Studies. An excerpt from the 
interview follows: 

Question: The reformist force in TNI seems to have won the President's favor 
through the installment of Maj. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah as commander of the 
Army Strategic Reserves Command (Kostrad). Do you see more chances for reform 
in the near future? 

Answer: This measure should indeed be appreciated but its significance 
depends on what it is for. It is surely the second most significant step 
since November (the reshuffle in which Gen. Wiranto as TNI commander was 
replaced by Adm. Widodo A.S.); others are that Wiranto (former coordinating 
minister for political affairs and security) now has no more ties to military 
headquarters and will enter retirement. 

But how to push internal reform is still a big question. 

For Agus this may be a big promotion but it would be more strategic to have 
him apply his ideas on the territorial doctrine affecting civil military 
relations as a regional commander. He has advocated the setting up of 
military commands only in remote areas. What would he do in the new post? 

So this measure is full of symbols; it's good for (President Abdurrahman 
Wahid) Gus Dur, he's nearer to officers perceived as more loyal to him, he's 
safer now, what with statements from Cilangkap (military headquarters) which 
were supportive of him. Another symbol is that Agus' promotion is a slap to 
Wiranto. 

However, the latest reshuffle also contains compromises instead of measures 
toward reform, which is defined as civilian supremacy and the removal of the 
territorial doctrine. (Former Army Strategic Reserves commander) Lt. Gen. 
Djaja Suparman (considered Wiranto's ally) has only been transferred to the 
army staff command school. 

So the measures are mainly consolidation by Gus Dur; it's "yes" for Gus Dur's 
supremacy and "no" for (meaningful steps) in civil military relations. 

What compensation do you see likely for TNI for their lost powers? Adm. 
Widodo suggested retaining seats in the People's Consultative Assembly after 
TNI quits the legislative body in 2004. 

I think the Assembly seats would be granted, after all Gus Dur has never been 
explicit about TNI reforms. Maybe we should accept that TNI should be 
entitled to vote and be voted for once they're out of the legislative body. 
Like in Germany and the United States, they no longer serve in the armed 
forces if they're appointed (to a civilian post) ... 

Further compensation would likely be a reallocation in the military budget 
aimed at better welfare. The request for 22 ships for the navy may also be 
granted. 

What measures would be feasible within TNI for further reform? 

Ask Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah, supposedly the most reformist officer, when 
TNI will get out of politics. He once said, "when civilians are ready"; so 
things are still like that. In some way they will still find a way to play a 
role in the political and social spheres. 

Do you see Gus Dur as still largely going it alone regarding changes in TNI? 

He's starting to be too much. Democratization cannot rely on him alone ... 
his "adhoc-ism" or "so-what-ism" (biarinisme); his main concern now is 
consolidating power. We need institutionalized practices (leading to major 
decisions). Those being promoted may be good but are actually weak in the 
eyes of Cilangkap. 

Gus Dur might be good now but we can't say what will happen next week. 
Article 10 of the 1945 Constitution says the president has the highest 
authority in the armed forces; that's very nice for him but the authority is 
crucial when TNI is now at a low point. 

How do you see the response toward reform within TNI? 

More responses are coming from majors downwards. Less can be seen from older 
officers, lieutenant colonels upwards, who might still hope for a return to 
security if they were to toe the line. (anr) 

----------------

Jakarta Post
February 29, 2000 

Editorial

No routine tours

Tours of duty may be normal occurrences in an organization as dynamic and 
developed as the Indonesian Military (TNI), but given TNI's national 
prominence, every single change at the top of its leadership today has 
significant consequences for the life of the republic. The reshuffle in the 
TNI top leadership that was announced on Monday by TNI chief spokesman Air 
Rear Marshal Graito Usodo is even more important in the context of 
Indonesia's contemporary politics. 

The military this past year has come under an unusual barrage of criticism, 
not only because of its past actions, but also because of its reluctance to 
give up its political role and a host of other privileges. The behavior of 
some of the generals at times defies the military's own claim that it is 
vigorously pursuing internal reforms. Such an internal contradiction only 
goes to confirm that some generals cannot adapt to the changing times, and 
are refusing to give up many of the privileges the military has taken for 
granted as its historical right. 

Yet, the success of Indonesia's bid to become a full-fledged democracy to a 
large extent hinges on TNI's attitude. Civil society, the goal of the reform 
movement that began in 1998, can never be attained as long as the military 
remains an active political player. TNI's political role today remains the 
single biggest obstacle in Indonesia's march toward civil society. 

The TNI leadership has professed to have taken on the reformist mantle, 
claimed to have introduced a new paradigm and promised to relinquish its 
political representation in the House of Representatives by 2004. This is a 
progressive retreat from politics for an institution that has virtually 
dictated the course of the nation's history in the last three decades. 

Unfortunately, however, the promise of scaling back its political role has 
not been matched by the actions and statements of some of its top officers. 
Such behavior has raised doubts whether the military is genuine in its 
retreat, or is simply buying time. 

These doubts in turn undermine TNI's public image as reflected in the endless 
criticisms against the military. TNI Chief Navy Admiral Widodo A.S. has the 
unenviable task of restoring its credibility and regaining public confidence. 
While no one doubts Widodo's credentials in leading the TNI down the reform 
path, he must still prevail over some of the Army generals who are not 
falling in line. His duty is therefore clear: Purge the TNI of officers whose 
commitment towards reform is questionable. 

Widodo's appointment in October replacing Gen. Wiranto in itself was a major 
step in reforming the TNI. He became the first Navy officer to assume the top 
military leadership, which had previously been the domain of the Army. That 
was the beginning. Since then, Widodo has made a number of changes in the top 
TNI leadership, putting younger and reformist officers in strategic top 
posts. On Monday he put Maj. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah, a rare staunch 
reformist officer, as chief of the Army's Strategic Reserves Command 
(Kostrad). Widodo can count on the full support of President Abdurrahman 
Wahid and the public in purging the TNI of nonreformist officers. We expect 
more "tours of duty" in the coming weeks as he continues with the reform 
process. 

Ultimately, the goal of the current round of tours of duty must be to 
strengthen TNI's professionalism, which because of its heavy politicization 
in the past, is sorely lacking. Widodo must end the military's habit of 
forming cliques which reflect the interests of powerful officers or certain 
ideologies in TNI. 

Longtime TNI watchers are by now familiar with such terms as the Murdani 
clique, the Prabowo clique, the Wiranto clique, and the green/Thaliban camp 
or the red-and-white/nationalist camp. Each one of these denotes the figure 
or ideology to which officers in that group owe their allegiance and loyalty. 
Such division is the consequence of TNI, or more precisely its leaders, 
toying too much with politics to fulfill the interests and ambitions of 
individuals rather than the force or the nation. 

If Indonesia is to become a full-fledged democracy where the military is put 
in its proper place, then it needs a much less politicized and much more 
professional TNI. 
 
 

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